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Abstract: In John Searle’s original taxonomy of types of illocutionary acts 
(Searle 1969) he points out that some kinds of illocutionary acts are special 
cases of other kinds, giving the example that questions are in fact special 
cases of requests. In that way, a ‘real question’ is a request for information 
that the sender does not already possess, whereas an ‘exam question’ is a 
request for information that the sender has already access to. Th is paper takes 
this rudimentary analysis some steps further and attempts a taxonomy of 
interrogative speech acts based on sets of more specifi c preparatory conditions 
such as sender expects / does not expect reply and sender has access to / does not 
have access to the requested information. Th e paper will show that a system of 
these sets of preparatory conditions can generate illocutionary defi nitions of a 
range of diff erent types of interrogative speech acts.
Keywords: Interrogative speech acts, Illocutionary acts, Speech acts, Taxonomy, 
Preparatory conditions
1. Introduction
Any analytical attempt at categorizing questions is bound to challenge its own 
methodical boundaries at some point or other, since the category of questions, 
regardless of what terminological and methodical approaches are chosen, seems 
to be notoriously transcendent. Questions can hardly be reduced to a certain 
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feature of syntax, a form of conversational activity, or a particular sort of act. 
Acknowledging the considerable problems of constraining the category, this 
article explores a particular type of speech act analysis, proposing a specifi c set 
of preparatory conditions  (following Searle’s classifi cation (Searle 1969)) as a 
framework for distinguishing between diff erent distinct types of interrogative 
speech acts. Th e approach is quite narrow, and hence limited in its scope, but 
at the same time some real-life tokens are provided that appear to exemplify 
the illocutions in question whenever these illocutions and their contextual 
conditions are not self-evident. Such brief detours involve observations from 
conversation analysis, argumentation analysis, and functional grammar.
 Th e article is based on, and takes as its theoretical starting point, a 
proposition based approach to speech acts following Searle’s original theoretical 
framework. While it is recognized that a proposition based approach to speech 
acts is by no means uncontested – in the current issue this is most lucidly 
demonstrated in Borchmann 2020 – for now I regard that discussion as being 
beyond the scope of this presentation. Th e aim here is merely to explore how a 
system based on Searlean-style preparatory conditions can account for various 
distinct types of interrogative speech acts.
2. Expanding Searle’s original distinctions
In speech act classifi cations such as Searle’s (Searle 1969) it is common to 
classify types of acts on a general level, so that e.g. representatives, directives, 
etc. each include a number of more specifi c speech acts. Th ese more specifi c 
act types are more useful for purposes of analyzing empirical language than 
the general categories they represent, yet the various specifi c speech acts are 
not described in much detail. Certainly, Searle’s account of questions was 
only exemplary (see also Borchmann’s discussion of this in the current issue 
(Borchmann 2020: section 3)). He discusses two diff erent question types 
(both specifi c subtypes of the directive class) which diff er from each other 
by virtue of whether or not the sender, as a preparatory condition, has initial 
access to the information that realises the speech act’s propositional content 
(Searle 1969: 69). But following that analysis, there appears to be at least two 
more types of question. When considering an additional parameter, namely 
whether or not the sender in fact expects a reply from the recipient, four 
diff erent types of question present themselves, systematically separated by two 
sets of preparatory conditions: sender has access to the requested information 
(yes / no) and sender expects reply (yes / no).
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 Th ese two sets of preparatory conditions are represented in table 1.
Sender has access to 
requested information
Sender expects reply
Clarifi cation No Yes
Control Yes Yes
Rhetorical Yes No
Th erapeutic No No
Table 1. Simple combination of two sets of preparatory conditions for clarifi cation 
questions (default in an unmarked context), control questions (e.g. at exams), 
rhetorical questions (mainly in argumentative contexts), and therapeutical questions 
(e.g. supervision, councelling, therapy sessions).
An initial note is due on what the term ‘reply’ should be taken to mean in 
this context. Clearly, in any exchange of speech acts, there will be a general 
preparatory condition that the sender expects a response that is appropriate 
to the goal or direction of the talk exchange. Taken in that sense, where ‘reply’ 
means ‘any contextually appropriate response’, the category ‘sender expects 
reply’ would seem to invariantly be ‘yes’. Th is expectation is fundamental to the 
mechanism of conversational implicature, where an obvious disregard of the 
expected or preferred response initialises an inferential process for generating 
alternative meaning potential (Grice 1975), as illustrated in example (1). 
(1)
(1.1) A: Did you notice how poorly dressed she is?
(1.2) B: It is a lovely party isn’t it?
B’s apparent fl outing of A’s expectation for an appropriate response will set 
the implicatural process in motion. In that theoretical context, most speech 
acts can be expected to warrant a reply in the general sense of adhering to the 
direction of the communicative exchange.
 In this study the term ‘reply’ is used in a narrower sense that pertains 
specifi cally to interrogative speech acts. In the unmarked case of interrogative 
speech act, i.e. the clarifi cation question, the unmarked reply is one that 
commits to the information being requested, that is a positive or negative 
answer, or an indication of ignorance or of non-committal. A reply in this sense 
is a reaction in which an epistemological stance is taken on the information 
which realises the propositional content of the speech act in question. In that 
sense, B’s answer in (1.2), while being a response, does not constitute a reply. 
As we will address in the following, the types of speech acts in which a reply 
in this sense is not expected are also the types that are furthest removed from 
the clarifi cation question, being essentially indirect types of speech acts.
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 On another terminological note, the term ‘to have access to’ is used 
pertaining to the information realised by the interrogative speech acts’ 
propositional content. Th e term avoids a variety of ambiguities connected to 
the otherwise more common expression ‘to know’. In the current context, the 
expression ‘to have access to’ is used to designate any ability to cognitively 
process the information in question, be that epistemological or normative, 
rational og irrational.
 Table 1 lays out the initial, simple categorization using the abovementioned 
categorical distinctions:
 Clarifi cation questions are the default question type, i.e. the interpretation 
that participants can be expected to employ in an unmarked context: Th ere are 
no special contextual factors indicating that the sender intends anything other 
than what is at the heart of the standard interpretation of what a question is: 
Sender expects an answer, since sender does not have access to the answer. 
 Control questions, the other type mentioned by Searle, occur in contexts 
where the situation prescribes that the sender has the special role of assessing 
or checking the recipient’s knowledge. Control questions are based on the 
assumption that the sender already knows the answer, but that some kind of 
need to test the recipient’s knowledge requires that he or she gives a reply. It 
usually occurs in institutionalized contexts such as tests and exams. Control 
questions are probably also found in certain types of interrogation (see also 
Mortensen 2020, this issue).
 Th e rhetorical question famously does not require a reply since everyone 
involved (including the sender) knows the answer, and everyone involved is 
assumed to know that everyone knows the answer. It is used argumentatively / 
persuasively as a stylistic feature that can accentuate an argumentative context 
or point.
 Finally, there is the therapeutic question, characterized by the condition 
that sender’s interest is not directed at obtaining a reply to the question, nor 
does sender have access to (or even want to have access to) the information 
in question. Characteristically, the purpose of the question is to initiate and 
facilitate a process of recognition and self-refl ection within the recipient. 
It occurs typically in counselling situations, in supervision settings and in 
therapeutic conversations. Clearly, an actual reply may indeed be given, but 
the reply is not strictly necessary for the exchange to commence. A mere 
response that gives some indication that the speech act elicits the desired type 
of refl ective process in the receiver, such as a nod or an acknowledgement of 
the relevance of the question, may suffi  ce.
 A word of caution with regard to the contexts given here for the diff erent 
categories of questions. Th e approach here is to examplify various types of 
illocutionary defi nitions, not to claim that such speech act types exhaust 
or entirely cover the dialogical registers of the contexts mentioned. A good 
example is the therapeutic question: it is not the intention to suggest that 
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this illocutionary defi nition adequately describes therapeutic practices and 
the dialogical dynamics associated with them (see Brink and Jensen 2020 
in the current issue whose study of therapeutic contexts adequately proves 
this point). Th e approach here only suggests that speech act types like the 
ones generated by the combinations of preparatory conditions are plausible 
in real life, and that the mentioned contexts are examples of such real life 
environments.
 Th e four categories of interrogative speech acts treated this far constitute 
a fi rst approximation of a defi nitory system, using a simple set of preparatory 
conditions. However, the classifi cation is far from exhausted using this simple 
system, since it is not hard to fi nd examples of questions that do not seem to 
be covered by it. 
3. Taking the analysis further
In an introduction to the fi eld of Conversation Analysis, Hutchby & Wooffi  tt 
treats the example
(2)
(2.1) Mother: Do you know who’s going to that meeting?
(example treated by Hutchby and Wooffi  tt 1988: 15f.)
Th e speech act may indeed apply as a clarifi cation question in an unmarked 
context, but on the assumption that the context involves the shared knowledge 
that the sender is in fact aware of the information in question, it can be 
reinterpreted as a ‘pre-announcement’, i.e, a sequential initiation that, given 
that a following turn expresses a negative reply, leads the sender to proceed 
with actually providing the information in question. 
 In conversation analysis, the determination of a token of conversational 
activity can only be accomplished in sequential context – i. e. the analyst may 
be able to categorize an act as a pre-announcement question only when the 
sequence seems to indicate that it has that function, as in (3):
(3)
(3.1) D: Didju hear the terrible news?
(3.2) R: No, what.
(example treated in Terasaki: 184)
Clearly, it is only the reply by the recipient (R) and the (assumed) subsequent 
approval of the sender (D) that this reply is indeed the preferred one, that 
indicates that this is in fact a genuine pre-announcement question. To clarify, 
once we apply the sequential context to our fi rst example, it is evident that the 
function of the activity is subject to sequential negotiation:
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(2)
(2.1) Mother: Do you know who’s going to that meeting?
(2.2) Russ: Who?
(2.3) Mother: I don’t know!
(2.4) Russ: Oh, probably Mr. Murphy and Dad (…)
(example treated by Hutchby and Wooffi  tt 1988: 15f.)
In (2.2) Russ clearly treats Mother’s activity in (2.1)  as a pre-announcement 
question, aft er which it turns out (in (2.3)) that it was not intended as such 
aft er all. Russ then goes on to repair the situation in (2.4), acknowledging that 
the question was in fact intended to be of the clarifi cation type.
 Pre-announcement sequences are well known and documented as 
interaction devices, and their existence requires us to introduce a new set 
of preparatory conditions: namely, sender expects the recipient to have access 
to the requested information (yes / no). Th e parameter sender intends to 







the recipient to 











Clarifi cation No Yes Yes No
Control Yes Yes Yes No
Rhetorical Yes Yes No Yes
Th erapeutic No Yes No No
Pre-announcement Yes No Yes Yes
Table 2. Expansion with pre-announcement.
As discussed above, the term ‘reply’ is used to represent a situation where the 
recipient at a minimum reacts in a way that is appropriate to the question, i.e. 
yes or no, indicating doubt, or, in the case of wh-type questions, providing the 
requested information or indicating ignorance or non-committal. So giving 
a mere reply (in the sense stipulated in this article) does not imply that a 
positive, ‘correct’ answer is given. Th ere is a consequential diff erence between 
the category sender expects recipient to have access to the requested information 
and sender expects a reply. You can expect a reply without expecting the 
recipient to know the answer, since a reply may be negative.
 Th us, in the pre-announcement question, a reply is expected because the 
adjacency pair ‘pre-announcement / no’ is a prerequisite for the sequence to 
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continue on to the sender eventually providing the information. As stated in 
the third preparatory condition, the sender does not expect the recipient to 
have access to the information, and hence the reply is required to be negative. 
Th e adjacency pair is locked to a no-reply as the preferred response, which 
is another way of saying that the recipient’s ignorance is a prerequisite for 
the interaction to proceed appropriately. Th is is where the pre-announcement 
question diff ers from the other four.
 On a side note, it seems that only questions that condition yes / no answers 
are able to appear as pre-announcement questions, while the wh-types may 
only be found in the other four variants that we have discussed so far.
 Another type of question is the echo question, which is characterized by the 
fact that the sender is not responsible for the speech act of asking, but rather for 
the speech act of reproducing an already stated question. Th is type of question 
belongs to a meta-linguistic register in that it restates or paraphrases another 
person’s question. I have suggested elsewhere that questions like these are 
especially prominent in argumentative interaction, where reconstructions of 
the opponent’s position are frequently seen (Nielsen 2005). Van Eemeren and 
Grootendorst 1992 employ the argumentative roles protagonist and antagonist 
to represent the argumentative roles of defending a claim, and of contesting 
or criticising the claim, respectively (for further discussion of these concepts 
of argumentation theory see Nielsen 2016: chapter 9). Th e special case of the 
echo question is characterized by being employed by the protagonist when in a 
rhetorical move anticipating a question from the antagonist, as in example (4). 
A columnist uses the echo question to establish a situation where an imagined 
antagonist poses a question that he then sets off  to answer:
(4)
In general, the new Russia is getting a worse reputation than the old Sovjet 
Union, even with us, and that’s a paradox. What the reason is? Th e reason is 
that we have been insulted by the attitude of Russia (…)
Quoted in Th erkelsen 2006: 221. (Transl. NMN)
As demonstrated by Th erkelsen (Th erkelsen 2006), an indicator of the echo 
question is the inverted word order compared to the other types of question 
discussed here. In the echo question the unmarked form “what is the reason?” 
is inverted as “what the reason is?”. Th is syntactic shift  is polyphonically coded 
as it echoes the voice of the recipient. Th us it codifi es an external voice taking 
responsibility for the speech act conditions, a voice that cannot be identical 
to the sender (regarding the analysis of linguistic polyphony see Th erkelsen 
et al 2007). Finkbeiner (2020, current issue) treats verb-fi nal wh-clauses in 
German and suggests that in their function as news headlines they have non-
interrogative illocutions. When not acting in that particular, genre-specifi c 
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role, however, they retain an unmarked function as embedded interrogative 
wh-clauses – oft en allowing for the ‘echo’-interpretation suggested here.
 We can now expand the chart with yet another category that actually 
turns out to be distinctive from the other fi ve types by virtue of the particular 
preparatory conditions involved. While the echo question is quite similar to the 
rhetorical question, it crucially diff ers in the fact that the successful utterance 
of an echo question is conditional on the recipient not being expected to have 
advance access to the requested information.
Sender has 




the recipient to 











Clarifi cation No Yes Yes No
Control Yes Yes Yes No
Rhetorical Yes Yes No Yes
Th erapeutic No Yes No No
Pre-announcement Yes No Yes Yes
Echo Yes No No Yes
Table 3. Expansion with echo question.
Like the pre-announcement question, the echo question can be understood 
as a dialogue-structuring device. It has the basic function of committing or 
engaging the recipient, but in its rather more strategic/rhetorical function, 
it also works by staging an imagined recipient asking for more information, 
eff ectively serving to retain the conversational turn while concurrently 
simulating interaction.
 Are there yet other types of questions that may be described by the proposed 
sets of preparatory conditions? We shall now proceed by taking a look at some 
of the combinations that have not yet been treated. One such combination 
is the no, no, no, no constellation. Th is type of question could be called a 
monologue question, since it mostly appears in theatrical or otherwise artistic 
contexts where an inner monologue is externalized for dramatic reasons:
(5)
Why do the birds go on singing?
Why does the sea rush to shore?
Don’t they know it’s the end of the world?
(Brenda Lee (1963): Th e End of the World)
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No reply is expected here, while neither the sender nor the recipient are aware 
of the answer, nor does the question suggest that the sender is obliged or 
inclined to actually aff ord an answer. Th is seems to follow from the assumption 
that the recipient in an internal monologue coincides with the sender. Th e 
monological question is also well known in types of self-reproach such as why 
did I not go home earlier?
 Moreover, tokens can likely be found of a question featuring the 
combination no, no, yes, no, i.e. a speech act where the only preparatory 
condition in our system that is positively redeemed is a reply, a reply which, 
since the recipient is not expected to have access to the requested information, 
is bound to be negative. Concurrently, the sender is in a similar ignorance 
(and therefore cannot intend to supply the requested information). One can 
imagine that this type of question can be found in contexts where it merely 
serves to consolidate the awareness of a common ignorance between sender 
and recipient. I propose to call this type the dialogical question. It represents 
a dialogization of the monological question - since a reply is required. How 
can it continue to rain?, What is the point that she should be taken away so 
young?, and so forth. In practice, drawing a distinction between monological 
and dialogical question tokens may prove to be highly dependent on context.
 With the monologue and dialogue questions we are beginning to move 
towards forms of expression that are not ‘real questions’ in so far as they 
show some indirectness. While they don’t seem to have the ‘real question’ 
characteristic of being aimed at eliciting or producing some form of 
information, they both seem to be able to count as forms of regret and to 
possess an inherent emotive function.
Sender has 




the recipient to 











Clarifi cation No Yes Yes No
Control Yes Yes Yes No
Rhetorical Yes Yes No Yes
Th erapeutic No Yes No No
Pre-announcement Yes No Yes Yes
Echo Yes No No Yes
Monological No No No No
Dialogical No No Yes No
Table 4. Expansion with monologue and dialogue questions.
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On a more speculative level, I suggest that two additional types of questions, 
in the following referred to as the ‘phatic’ question and the ‘off ensive’ question, 
should be considered, while acknowledging that these fi nal analyses are quite 
tentative. One potential problem is that while the monologue and dialogue 
questions discussed above have aspects of indirectness, these two suggested 
question types are clearly indirect speech acts in the sense of Searle 1979 
(Searle 1979: 30–57) or alternatively, utterances that could be understood as 
forms of particular conversational implicature, following Grice 1975. For the 
present purpose we adopt Searle’s rather crude analysis of indirectness, since 
its distinction between primary and secondary illocutions is a more accessible 
way to approach these question types, than is the concise, yet also complicated, 
framework of Grice. Th e determination of these indirect question types is 
considerably more complex than direct questions since the analysis needs to 
operate at two diff erent levels simultaneously, i.e. the ‘secondary illocution’ 
(the literal meaning) and the ‘primary illocution’ (the implied meaning). While 
these speech act types do exhibit superfi cial features of being questions (e.g. 
they are written with question marks etc), they are clearly not interrogative in 
terms of their primary illocutions, where they carry the forces of  greetings 
and charges, respectively.
 In Roman Jakobson’s account of language functions, the phatic function 
is the function that opens, maintains and closes down linguistic contact 
(Jakobson 1960), prototypes being greetings and salutations. Phatic questions 
comprise utterances such as How do you do? and What’s up? Th ey are indirect 
speech acts in that their primary illocutionary function is to start or maintain 
communicative contact. Th erefore, a reply that literally adresses the requested 
information is normally not appropriate (Garfi nkel’s 1967 experiments show 
how breaching properties of common discourse is socially stressful (Garfi nkel 
1967: 42–44.)), while it will obviously also be inappropriate for the sender to 
supply the information, as the speech act is not really a question at all. So the 
phatic question seems to realise the yes-yes-no-no constellation in the system.
 Off ensive questions, with the constellation yes-yes-yes-yes, are also indirect 
speech acts, as they will normally function as accusations or reproaches such 
as: What was that for?, What do you think you’re doing? or Do you think that 
was particularly clever? I suggest that a negative reply is the preferred response, 
counting as an acceptance of the reproach. While such a reply is desired, the 
question, by virtue of its indirect status, counts as the sender in fact conveying 
an act of reproach or accusation. In a sense, the sender expects the recipient to 
have access to the requested information, which explains why it is not entirely 
appropriate to answer I don’t know to what do you think you are doing? simply 
because this reply refl ects a confusion of the secondary with the primary 
illocution. 
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Sender intends to 
supply (or imply) 
the requested 
information
Clarifi cation No Yes Yes No
Control Yes Yes Yes No
Rhetorical Yes Yes No Yes
Th erapeutic No Yes No No
Pre-announcement Yes No Yes Yes
Echo Yes No No Yes
Monological No No No No
Dialogical No No Yes No
Phatic Yes Yes No No
Off ensive Yes Yes Yes Yes
Table 5. Expansion with phatic and off ensive questions.
As already noted, these last types of question challenge the system’s descriptive 
force, mainly because they are clearly indirect and consequently harder to 
disambiguate as speech act types in terms of primary illocution. An example 
that may be hard to place is Do you take me for a fool? which, although at fi rst 
glance it seems to belong to the off ensive category, is ambiguous with regard 
to categories 3 and 4, yielding something like the constellation yes-yes-?-?.
4. Concluding remarks
Th e proposed system can describe diff erences between a range of speech 
acts, based on diff erent preparatory conditions, speech acts which appear on 
the surface to be questions. In terms of combinatorics, a chart featuring four 
conditions, each of which realises a binary value, will generate a total of 16 
possible combinations. However, four of these can already be excluded, namely 
any case of ‘no’ to the sender having access to the requested information, 
and ‘yes’ to the sender intending to supply the information, as this would be 
logically incoherent. To be specifi c, it can be observed that some of the four 
categories are logically interdependent, so conditions one and four are locked 
into a set of reciprocal entailment relations: if the sender intends to supply 
the requested information, then the sender must have access to the requested 
information. It follows that ‘no’ to condition one entails ‘no’ to condition four, 
while ‘yes’ to condition four entails ‘yes’ to condition one.
 In consequence, there are twelve distinct options in this system, presented 
below in a systematic outline of the possible combinations:
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Sender intends to 
supply (or imply) 
the requested 
information
Off ensive Yes Yes Yes Yes
Control Yes Yes Yes No
Rhetorical Yes Yes No Yes
Phatic Yes Yes No No
Pre-announcement Yes No Yes Yes
? Yes No Yes No
Echo Yes No No Yes
? Yes No No No
* No Yes Yes Yes
Clarifi cation No Yes Yes No
* No Yes No Yes
Th erapeutic No Yes No No
* No No Yes Yes
Dialogical No No Yes No
* No No No Yes
Monological No No No No
Table 6. A systematic overview of the available combinations.
* indicates that the question is logically impossible because the sender’s intention to 
communicate the requested information presupposes his having access to it. 
? indicates a question type that is logically possible within the system but has not 
been accounted for. 
As mentioned, four combinations seem to be logically impossible, which 
leaves us with two types of questions that have not been accounted for in this 
study, constellations yes-no-yes-no, and yes-no-no-no. 
 Th us, the system has described ten distinct types of speech acts, all of 
which seem to be able to function interrogatively, at least in their superfi cial 
secondary illocutions.
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